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IN TEE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LITTLE AMERICA REFINING 
COMPANY, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Ap?ellant, 
CASE NO. 17331 
JESSE ALBERT LEYBA, 
SVEN HE IMBERG, 
Defendant, and 
Defendant-
Re.spondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for pro?erty damage to appellant's 
service station arising from a collision between defendant 
Leyba's vehicle and a vehicle driven by respondent. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before a jury on August 28, 1980. 
At the close of appellant's case, respondent moved for a directed 
verdict which was granted by the court. Default judgment was 
entered against defendant Leyba. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the trial court's 
directed verdict dis~issing appellant's case as to respondent. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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STATE~ENT OF FACTS 
In the early morning hours of April 2, 1979, a collL 
occurred between vehicles driven by defendant Leyba and responc 
which resulted in damages to appellant's service station on Bee 
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. (T., pp. 118-119) 
The accident occurred when the vehicle driven by 
Leyba collided with the left rear portion of respondent's 
truck, causing respondent's truck to slide into the gas pumps 
at appellant's station and resulting in a fire. (T., pp. 149· 
150) 
At trial, appellant's counsel attempted to introduce 
testimony concerning the speed of the vehicles involved froma1 
employee of the service station, Barry Bell, who witnessed the 
accident. The Court sustained objections to the testimony on 
foundational grounds and excluded it from consideration. 
(T., pp. 95-96) 
Respondent testified to a series of incidents which 
occurred between a passenger in his vehicle and the occupants 
of the Leyba vehicle as they drove north on State Street shorti; 
before the accident involved herein. He further testified that 
he turned left at the intersection of State Street and Thi~ 
North and proceeded on Third North to Main Street where he 
turned right. At that time, the Leyba vehicle, which had turnr 
right at Third North, reappeared behind respondent's truck, 
cut around respondent's vehicle and '_:larked sideways in front c' 
respondent's truck. Respondent stop9ed his truck and an 
-2-
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altercation occurred between a passenger from respondent's 
vel1icle and one frorr Leyba' s vehicle. A fistfight between the 
passengers ensued and when it ended, respondent drove away from 
the scene down Victory Road. (T., pp. 145-149) 
On direct, respondent testified that he did not 
participate in the incidents or fight between the passengers 
other than that he was driving one of the vehicles. He 
~stified that, after the fight ended, he drove away at a 
normal rate of speed, oroceeded d01vn Victory Road when the 
Leyba vehicle came up behind him at a high rate of speed, rear-
ended him causing his truck to slide into the gas pumps. At 
no time was he racing w.fth or attempting to get away from the 
Leyba truck. (T., pp. 151-154) 
At the close of appellant's case, the Court granted 
respondent's motion for a directed verdict on the basis that 
the evidence of negligence by respondent was insufficient to 
submit the case to the jury. (T., p. 171) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN 
REFUSIHG TO ADMIT TESTIMONY CONCER..,.._.-
ING THE SPEED OF THE VEHICLZS 
Appellant's counsel attempted to introduce testimony 
by Barry Bell, an employee of appellant who witnessed the 
accident, concerning the speed, in miles per hour, of respondent's 
and Leyba's vehicles. Bell testified he saw the vehicles coming 
down Victory Road prior to the collision and that he had 
observed "millions" of cars coming down the same stretch of 
-3-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
road. (T., pp. 94-95) However, at no tiMe did counsel for 
appellant elicit testimony from Mr. Bell that he drove a car 
himself, that he had observed his speedometer while driving, 
i.e., that he had a basis for estimating the speed of vehicles, 
Simply stating he had watched vehicles come down Victory Road, 
without any evidence of his familiarity with operating a car, 
is insufficient as a foundation for the admission of opinion 
testimony as to the speed of a vehicle. 
It was precisely on foundational grounds that the 
trial court sustained respondent's objections to the testimony 
of Mr. Bell as to the estimated speed of the vehicles. 
Respondent has no quarrel with the proposition that a layman's 
opinion estimating speed of a vehicle is admissible where a 
foundation for such opinion is made. 
Both cases cited by appellant in support of its 
argument that Bell's opinion should have been admissible 
recognize that such testimony is proper only when there is a 
foundation for the same. The Court in Townsend v. hThatton, 
21 Ariz. App. 556, 521 P.2d 1014 (1974), cited the case of 
Southwestern FreightLines, Ltd. v. Floyd, 58 Ariz. 249, 119 
P.2d 120 (1941), in support of the proposition that even a 
non-driver could testify as to speed where qualified by experier. 
In Floyd, supra, a 12 year old girl was allowed to 
testify as to the speed of a vehicle based on her experience of 
riding on many occasions with her father and observing the car's 
speedometer as a basis for estimating speed. 
Similarly, in Potts v. Brown, Wyo., 452 P.2d 975 
(1969), the speed estimates of two teen-age witnesses were 
-4-
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ler. 
Ji 
based on their driving experience, observation of other cars 
while driving within speed limits, etc. 
Appellant's position in the case at bar simply pre-
supposes that his witness was qualified by experience to 
estimate speed without any foundation that he had ever driven 
a car or ridden in one himself. 
The trial court herein ruled correctly in excluding 
the testimony of Bell where there was no proper foundation. 
The question of adrnissibili ty of opinion testimony is within the 
discretion of the trial court and should not be upset without 
a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Ewell and Son, Inc. 
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 27 Utah 2d 188, 493 P.2 1283 (1972). 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE BY RESPONDENT 
IS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Appellant presupposes that a race or chase situation 
existed between the Leyba vehicle and respondent's vehicle and 
that the supposed chase was the direct and proximate cause of 
the damage to appellant's service station. The evidence adduced 
at trial simply fails to support that thesis. 
The key element of proof in any case involving an 
automobile collision is whether or not the driver of a vehicle 
operated it negligently so as to proximately cause damage to 
another party. 
Appellant's theory of the case presumes that 
respondent was negligent simply because he was the driver of a 
vehicle in which a passenger became involved in a series of 
-5-
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incidents with the occupants of another vehicle which cull'linat' 
in a fistfight. No evidence was offered that respondent operat 
his vehicle in a careless or negligent manner at any time from 
State Street through to the point of collision at appellant's 
service station. 
The only evidence of negligent driving was as to the 
Leyba vehicle. The Leyba vehicle swerved around respondent, 
turned off in a different direction, turned around and chased 
respondent down and cut off his vehicle. A brief altercation 
ensued, in which respondent did not participate, after which 
respondent drove off at a normal rate of speed. The Leyba 
vehicle later negligently collided with the rear of respondent'' 
vehicle causing the damage to appellant's service station. 
Appellant sought at trial to derive an inference of 
negligence from respondent's purported involvement in or failur1 
to restrain the tortious conduct of respondent's passenger. 
Counsel for respondent objected to the attempt to introduce an) 
testimony as to the incidents on State Street or the fight 
between occupants of the vehicles. 
The matter was argued at some length to the court out· 
side the presence of the jury. (T., pp. 124-140) The court 
found that appellant's authorities in support of his argument 
were actually contrary to his position. The incidents prior 
to the collision did not constitute a chain of negligent acts 
amounting to concurrent negli9ence by respondent. (T., p. 140) 
The court ruled that the evidence of the prior incidents would 
-6-
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be admitted but that appellant would be prohibited from relying 
upon it as a basis for ~resuming negligence or liability as to 
respondent. (T., pp. 140-142) 
Appellant relies heavily on the case of Hillyard v. 
Utah By-Products Co., l Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287 (1953), in 
support of the proposition that joint liability may exist where 
separate, but concurrent acts of negligence combine to cause 
injury. However, Hillyard, supra, is readily distinguishable 
from the case at bar. That case involved the issue of negligence 
as between the driver of a truck who had parked it five feet 
into the roadway and the driver of a car which collided with the 
truck. There was no series of claimed negligent acts nor any 
claim of a race or chase. 
The evidence of a race or chase in the instant case 
falls of its own weight. Appellant relies on the conclusory 
statements of two witnesses, Bell and Boyle, that the two vehicles 
appeared to be racing down Victory Road. No competent testimony 
was offered in support of those conclusions as to any speeding 
or negligent driving by respondent. 
'l'he cases cited by appellant on the issue of a race 
clearly involved testimony that vehicles were speeding or chas-
ing each other. In Lemons v. Kelly, 239 Ore. 354, 397 P.2d 
784 (1964), both the plaintiff and defendants testified that a 
race had occurred, and the case turned on whether or not the 
race had terminated prior to the accident. 
In the instant case, the series of events prior to 
the collision came to rest at the point where the fistfight 
-7-
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occurred. At that point, respondent drove away at a normal 
rate of speed and was heading home. The Leyba vehicle then carr, 
up behind respondent and collided with him while attempting to 
pass. Leyba's own testimony at a deposition in this case was 
that, rather than racing respondent down Victory Road, he wa 5 
hurrying to seek assistance for his companion who had been 
injured in the fistfight. 
There can be no dispute that respondent's vehicle 
sliding into the gas pumps was an actual cause, or cause-in-
fact, of appellant's damages. However, it is equally indisput-
able that the sole legal, or proximate, cause of the damages to 
appellant's station was Leyba's negligent act of rear-ending 
respondent's vehicle on Victory Road. 
Appellant's counsel, throughout his brief, assumes 
facts which were not in evidence at trial and attempts to link 
them in a supposedly concurrent chain of negligent acts culminat· 
ing in the collision. There is simply no competent, tangible 
shred of evidence to support that claim. 
The trial court was correct in ruling that the evidenci 
of negligence by respondent was insufficient to submit the case 
to the jury. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED TEE PROPER 
STANDARD IN GRANTING A DIRECTED 
VERDICT 
Appellant correctly states the standard to be employee 
by the trial court in considering a motion for a directed verdic' 
-8-
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1,e., the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the non-moving party and construe the controverted facts, if 
any, in that party's favor. Boskovich v. Dtah Construction co., 
123 Utah 387, 259 P. 2d 885 (1953). 
If the court finds that reasonable minds cannot differ 
as to the lack of negligence in a case such as the instant one, 
then it is obliged to direct a verdict as to the lack of liability. 
The Court, in the present case, ruled properly in that 
the uncontroverted facts established that the only negligent act 
which proximately caused the damage to appellant was Leyba' s 
negligence in rear-ending respondent. The fact that some sort 
of tortious incident occurred prior to the collision is irrelevant 
absent some showing of negligent operation of the truck driven 
by respondent. Appellant is entitled to no inference of negligence 
by respondent regardless of whether or not respondent was in-
valved in a dozen fistfights prior to the collision. 
The trial court correctly concluded herein that the 
evidence of negligence by respondent was insufficient, such that 
reasonable minds could not diff~r, and was compelled thereby 
to direct a verdict dismissing appellant's case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, respondent respectfully requests 
this Court to affirm the judgment of the District Court granting 
a directed verdict. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FcJ~lJiilsh ~v-<L 
Attorney for Respondent 
-9-
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